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Introduc  on
The  relati  nship between demographic  changes and poverty is an old
issue that has gained  currency  because of the  recent focus  of govern-
ments, m  ltilateral  agencies, and other  development organizations  on
poverty al eviation.  For the Philippines,  all of the post-Martial  Law gov-
ernments  have made  poverty  alleviation  their  centerpiece  program.
Analysts h ve been trying  to understand  why, in spite of this consistent
focus, gai  s in  poverty  alleviation  in  the  country  have been  modest.
The  most accepted  explanation,  being  the  most obvious  perhaps,  is
the uneve  economic  growth  performance.  However, it is wellknown,
although  eavily debated upon,  that demographic  factors  play an im-
portant  r  e not only in poverty alleviation  but even in economic growth
as well. P oviding  a systematic clarification  of this role is the objective
of this pa  er. Such clarification  may well inform  discussion on the role
demogra  hic  changes play on poverty  alleviation  efforts  in the coun-
try.
The ~aper is organized  as follows.  The  next two sections provide
a status r  port  on  the  demographic  as well  as the  poverty  front.  To
provide  a  ackground  on the  interaction  between population  and de-
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velop  ent, the experience  of the Philippines  and Thailand  in the past
40 ye rs is briefly  compared  in the following  section. This  is then fol-
lowed  by  a  description  of  the  known  links  between  demographic
chan  es and poverty.  Then  a section where  empirical  evidence  of the
links  re reviewed follows.  The  final  section draws some implications
for  p  licy.
Tre  in population  and poverty
Popul  tion  change  and  its  components
Popul  tion  change can be divided  into  changes in size, structure,  es-
pecia  y age structure,  and  distribution  across space. This  is easily de-
rivabl  from the mathematical  identity  that changes in population  size
can c  me from  either  births,  deaths, or  net migration.  An  empirical
regul  rity, known as  the demographic  transition  has been long observed
by de  ographers. This.is characterized  as consequent on, and later on
also c  using,  falling  child  mortality  is followed  by falling  fertility.  Ac-
cordi  gly, at the  first  stage, population  growth  rises because of a de-
cline  n mortality,  which is usually distributed  almost evenly across age
grou  s, with  fertility  remaining  high.  At this  stage, the  youth  depen-
den  ratio  will  be high.  In  the  next  stage, fertility  starts to  fall  with
mor  lity starting  to settle at a low level so population  growth  will  start
to  de  line.  In  this  stage, the  youth  dependency  ratio  will  start to  go
down  Finally,  both  fertility  and  mortality  will  be low and  remain  low
and p  pulation  growth also low. This will be accompanied  by high old-
age d  pendency ratio.  The  period  where the youth  dependency  starts
to  de  line,  which  also means  an increasing  proportion  of  economi-
cally  ctive population,  provides  a window  of  opportunity  for  the  so-
calle  "demographic  bonus"  that  can spur economic  growth.  This  is
now  ne of the familiar  explanations  to the  East Asia high  economic
grow  h  phenomenon  in  the  past  two  decades  (e.g.,  Bloom  and
Willi  mson 1998).
Demo  aPhic trends and imPlicationsl
Popul  tion  size and  growth
The  hilippine  population  has almost quadrupled  in  52 years  (from
19.2  illion  in 1948 to 76.5 million  in 2000). The growth rate was about
3 per  en!  in the 1960s slowing down to 2.3 percent  in the 1990s (Table
1). T  is growth rate is still very high compared to the country's  ASEAN

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































neig1 ors. Thailand  and Indonesia, for instance, reduced  their  growth
rates  0 1.4 and  1.6, respectively, in the 1990s. Consequently,  in com-
paris  n to Thailand  that almost had the same population  size in 1965,
the c  untry  had  about  14 million  more people  around  year 2000.
Fertili  y
Data  how what appears to be a fairly  rapid  decline  in  fertility  in the
1970s This was stalled  in the  1980s and 1990s and lately even showed
signs  f a slight increase. Total fertility  rate  (TFR) declined  from  about
6 at t  e beginning  of the  1960s to  3.6 by the  middle  of  1990s. This
trend  in  fertility  reduction  is slow by East and  even Southeast Asian
stand  rds (Table 2). Starting  with  about the same TFRs at the start of
1960s Thailand  and Indonesia  had reduced  their  TFR to 2.1 and 2.6,
respe  tively, by the middle  of 1990s.  This means a longer  catch-up time















ty, measured  either  as Crude  Death Rate or  Infant  Mortality
snowed rapid  decline  during  the  early post-war period  because
'ances in public  health  and rapid  economic  development.  This
e has slowed down in the recent past as low levels of mortality  or
evels of life  expectancy  have been achieved. This  is clearly de-
by the  developments  in infant  mortality  rate  (IMR)  (Table 2).
:ne uneven economic  performance,  the slow decline  of the IMR
Philippines  is to be expected  (De Guzman 1998). Thailand  with
Ilstent high  economic  growth  rate, was able to  sustain lower in-
lortality  rates than the Philippines  through  out the  post-war pe-
~outh Korea, starting  with  a low, but  not too  far  below, level of
[l 1960-65, achieved  an even faster decline.
)ased on the  above trends  in  fertility  and  mortality,  the  Philip-
pine  )opulation  growth  rate  is understandably  higher  than  many of
our nl:ighbors.  It is also clear that since our fertility  remains high,  the
only t.1ing that prevented  the full  impact of that on population  growth
is tha  our  uneven  economic  performance  has prevented  us  from
achie'ring  even lower  mortality  rates. What is disturbing,  and  may be
unknc)wn to  many, is that  the  continued  high  fertility  rates will  also
mean long years of  high  youth dependency  burden,  which  will  rob us
of th~window of opportunity  for the demographic  bonus that allowed
other  East Asian countries  to increase their  savings rates, physical and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































two d~cades. Herrin  and Pernia  (2000) describes what we continue  to
bear ~s "demographic  onus"  rather  than a demographic  bonus.
Defini ion and measures  of  poverty
Ther  are many issues in poverty measurement.  This  paper will focus
only  n the  main issues being discussed for the Philippines.2 The offi-
cial p  verty statistics uses current  income  as the basis for  computing
pover y incidence.  Balisacan (2001) argues that  current  consumption
is bet er than current  income  as the basis for measuring  poverty from
both  onceptual  and practical grounds. He further  argues that income
can u  der-  or  overestimate  living  standards  through  borrowing  and
savin.  Furthermore,  he says that welfare  level is determined  by "life-
cycle"  or "permanent"  incomes  and  current  consumption  is a better
meas  re  of this income.  Finally,  income  is much more  difficult  to ob-
tain a  d more  prone  to underreporting.  Self-rated  poverty,  which  is
depe  dent  neither  on incomes  nor  on  consumption  but  on qualita-
tive s  If-assessment,  has also been proposed  by Dr. Mahar Mangahas of
the S  cial Weather Stations.
here are also multidimensional  measures of well-being. One that
has g ined  local  official  acceptance  is the  so-called  minimum  basic
needs indicators.  This consists of several  indicators3 grouped into three,
name y: survival, security and enabling.  Reyes (2002) briefly  describes
its  pr  venance  in  her  paper.  Another  multidimensional  measure  of
well-b  ing that has gained  international  acceptance is the Human  De-
velop  ent  Index  (HDI)  developed  by United  Nations  Development
Prog  mme. This is based on four indicators:  1) life expectancy at birth;
2) fu  ctionalliteracy  and the 3) combined  elementary and high school
enrol  ment ratio;  and  4) real per capita income.
Trend in poverty alleviation
The  rogress  in  poverty  alleviation  in  the  country  is modest  (Reyes
2002).  In  fact the  number  of the  poor  has not  declined  but even in-
creas d from  4.6 million  in 1985 to  5.14 million  in 2000. In  addition,
the  r  duction  in  poverty incidence  is only happening  in urban areas.
Whil  the poverty incidence  in urban areas declined  by 14 percentage
poin  between  1985 and 2000. the  corresponding  number  for  rural
2 For  a!ore  complete  discussion  of  poverty  measurement  issues,  especially  in the  Philippine  context,
consult  ipton  and  Ravallion  (1995)  and  Reyes  (2002).
3  As of  I  st count,  it included  33  indicators  (Reyes  2002).ORBETA 201
areas is  nly 4 percentage  points  (Table 3). There  also remains a wide
disparity  of  poverty incidence  across geographic  areas. For  instance,
in 2000, it stood  at almost  66 percent  in the Autonomous  Region  of
Muslim  indanao  (ARMM)  and  55 percent  in  the  Bicol  region  as
against  nly 9 percent  in the National  Capital Region. Variation  at the
provinci  1 level is even more  pronounced.
Inc  me inequality  has not improved  either. The share of the poor-
est quin  .le has even declined  from  4.8 percent  in  1985 to 4.7 percent
in  2000  Reyes  2002).  The  share of the  richest  quintile,  on .the other
hand,  in  reased from  51.2 percent  to 54.8 percent  over the same pe-
riod.  In  ddition,  the  Gini  concentration  ratio  also went up from  0.47
in 1985  00.51  in 2000 (Figure  1).
Th  Asian crisis experience  has also shown that  the  Philippine
populati  n is vulnerable  to shocks as gains in  poverty alleviation  dur-
ing the  arlier  periods  were  easily reversed during  the crises.
Table  3.
Figure 1. GINI  ratios, 1975-2000PHILIPPINE  jOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMEN° 202
The  poverty  decomposition  analysis of Reyes (2002) reveals that
for  the period  1985-2QOO,  the  contribution  of the  growth  component
was larger  than the  distribution  componenL  The  growth  component
contributed  a 16.5 percentage-point  reduction  in  poverty  incidence
but  the  worsening  of the  distribution  increased  it  by 4.7 percentage
points,  resulting  in a net decline  of 9.4 percentage  points with  2.4 per-
centage points  classified as residual.
Table  4 shows that  our  poverty  reduction  record,  compared  to
those of our neighboring  countries  and using the  US$l  a day poverty
threshold,  is slower. In  addition,  most of these countries  were able to
reduce  the  number  of people  living  in poverty.  In terms  of the  HD!,
our neighbors  have also over taken us (Table 5).
A digression:  population  and development  in the Philippines
and Thailand
To  illustrate  the  role  of  demographic  changes in  development,  this
paper compares briefly  the socioeconomic  development  of the Philip-
pines  and Thailand  in the  last 40 years. Table 1 shows that  both  had
about 31 million  people  in 1965. In terms of per capita income  in real
US$, however, the Philippines  had $725 while Thailand  had only $465
(Table 6).  Forty years later, the  latest estimate of  Philippine  popula-
tion  is 76.5 million,  nearly  14 million  than Thailand's  62.8 million.  In
terms  of  per capita income,  Table  6 shows that Philippines  had  1,167
real US$ while  Thailand  had  2,805 US$ in  2000 or  almost 2.5 times.
Table  4.  Poverty  in selected  Asian countries,  summary  statistics: 1975-95
Peo~e  in PO"'rty  Head-count  Index  P~rty  Gap
EConOO1Y  (million)  (percent)  (percent)






























Notes:  All numbers  in this  table  are based  on the international  proverty  line of  US$1 per person per
day  at 1985  prices.
na Not available
.Data relate  to 1978  and apply  to rural  China only:
bin 1984  figures.


































Sources:  Hufan Development  Indicators,  HDR  2002;  Table  24  of Reyes  (2002)
The  deve opments  of these two indicators  over the years are shown in
Figures 2 and 3. While  it would  be wrong to attribute  all of this differ-
ence to  emographic  changes, comparing  the  two in this area would
provide  useful background  for the  succeeding discussions.
The  big  difference  between the  two countries  lies  in the  diver-
gence  in  fertility  levels, with  Thailand  being  able  to  bring  down  its
TFR to a  eplacement  level of around 2.1 at the beginning  of the 1990s
compare  to the Philippines'  more  than  4 at the time  and still  over 3
per wom  n today (Figure  4).  There  is not  much  divergence  in terms
of infant  ortalityas  both countries  were able to reduce  their  mortal-
ity levels  n a very similar fashion,  with Thailand  protecting  her initial
advantag  all throughout  the period  (Figure 5). The difference  in fer-
tility  leve s spawned not  only a divergence  in  population  growth  and
populati  n size (as discussed above)  but  also a glaring  deviation  in
youth de  endency burden,  as shown in Figure 6. Given that the fertil-
ity rates  re  hardly  closing,  this  difference  in  dependency  burden  is
sure to  ontinue  for  more  years. Among  the  known  impact  of  high
depende  cy burden is that it depresses  savings  and, consequently, physi-
cal as well  as human  capital  investments.  Figures  7 and  8 show that
indeed  s vings and investments have deviated since mid-80's.  Finally,
in recen  years Thailand  has begun  to surpass the Philippines  even in
investme  ts in  human  capital,  which  is evident  in  part  in  its enroll-
ment'rat  os in both secondary and tertiary levels, which have exceeded
the latte  '  s (Figure  9).
Populati  n and poverty:  a description  of the links
To descr"  e the links between population  and poverty, this paper deems
it best to  tart with the Population  and Sustainable Development Frame-
work (PS  F), as  presented in the 2001-2004  Philippine  Population Man-
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Figure  2. Per capita GDP,  real US$ (1995 = 100)
Source:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Indicators  2002
Figure 3. Population  size, 1960-2000
Source:  UN  World  Population  Prospects  2000  Revised
Figure 4. Total fertility  rate, 1960 to 2005P~ILIPPINEJOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 206
Figure 6. Youth and old  dependency  ratios,  1960 to
2005
Figure 7. Gross domestic savings as percentage  of
GDP,  1960-2000ORBETA 207
Figure 8. Gross capital formation as percentage of
GDP,  1960-2000
Figure 9. Gross  enrolment  rate,  secondary  and  ter-
tiary,  1970-1998
detail in  errin  (2002). Starting  with this framework  provides one with
a compre  ensive view of the relationships  between population  change
and the d fferent  dimensions  of development,  one of which is poverty.
Essentiall  , the  framework  shows that  demographic  processes (fertil-
ity, morta  ity, and migration)  and outcomes  (size, structure  and distri-
bution)  ect productive  capacities  (natural  resource  and  environ-
ment,  hu  ary resource)  and outcomes  (goods and services provision
and  cons  mption),  which  are translated  into  measures of wellbeing
(health,  utrition,  education,  desired fertility,  etc.).  In turn,  these de-
velopment  outcomes  affect demographic  processes and outcomes.
This  paper focuses next on the mechanisms through  which popu-
lation  ch  nges affect poverty. While  not  explicitly  depicted,  it would
soon be c ear that this is subsumed in the framework.IfHILIPPINEjOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT 208
here are three  main channels  through  which  population  affect
pover  .4  Following the taxonomy in Eastwood and Lipton  (1999,2001),
these  re: the growth, distribution  and conversion channels. The growth
chan  el refers to the  impact of demographic  variables on the  level or
growt  of attainable  welfare  per  person,  usually measured  by mean
in co  e or average consumption,  given the distribution  of income. The
distri  ution  channel refers to the impact  that alters the distribution  of
inco  e, given the attainable welfare  per person. The conversion chan-
nel r  fers to the changes in actual wellbeing  or capabilities,  given the
attain  ble welfare  per person.  In terms of the PSDF,  the growth  chan-
nel r  fers to the  impact  on the middle  box;  the  distribution  channel,
on th  impact  on the elements of both the middle  and the right  boxes;
and  t  e conversion  channel,  on the  right  box.  Eastwood and  Lipton
(2001)  point  out  that, among the  three,  only the, growth  channel  has
recei  ed considerable  attention  compared  to the  other  two.
he  ,growth  channel  refers  to  the  impact  of demographics  on
mean income  or average consumption.  Based on the production  func-
tion  oncept,  the discussions on the  growth  channel focus on the im-
pact  n  the  means of  generating  income  or factors  of production,
Figur~ 10.  Population  and sustainable  development framework
.This  ~nd the  subsequent paragraphs in this section draw heavily from Eastwood and Lipton (1999,
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namely, p  ysical and human  capital as well as technology and produc-
tivity.  Thi  is usually discussed in  two levels, the  macro  or aggregate
level and  he  micro  or  household  level.  At  the  aggregate  level, the
issues rev  lve ,around  the  impact  of population  changes in the aggre-
gate accu  ul~tion  of  physical and  human  capital.  Central  to the dis-
cussion is  he iimpact on savings, because it finances investments. The
impact  on aggregate investments  on human  capital such as education
and  healt  ,has  also been  given ample  attention.  Finally,  on the role
of popula  .on  changes on  the  development  of  technology  and  pro-
ductivity,  e ,central  question  is whether  population  changes affect
the develo  m~nt of technology  and thereby affect productivity.  At the
household  level,  similar  issues are  relevant  for  almost  identical  rea-
sons.
What  are the  mechanisms  in  the  distribution  channel?  Even if
relatively  I ttle  work  has been done  in this  area this issue has a long
history.  Ea twood  and  Lipton  (1999) trace the origins  of the income
distributio  ef:fect of higher  fertility  to Malthus.  He hypothesized  that
at the  agg egate level, high  fertility  would  raise the price  of food  and
lower the  rice  of labor. Since the  main  asset  of the  poor is his labor,
this  is exp  cted  to  affect  the  distribution  of  income.  Eastwood and
Lipton  (19  9,2001)  identify  two groups of ways through  which demo-
graphics  a fect  inequality  and poverty. These are the  dependency  effect
and  the  a quisition  effect.  These  two  subsume  the  aforementioned
Malthusia  effect. The dependency  effect refers to the hypothesis that
higher  fer  ility  worsens the  distribution  of  consumption  if  the  extra
births  are  n4entrated  in the poorer  households, raising dependency
ratios amo  g the  poor  disproportionately.  The  acquisition  effect,  on
the  other  and, refers to the worsening  of  consumption  distribution
via the  abi ity or willingness  of nondependents  to acquire  income  or
via their  sa .ngs behavior  and factor  rewards. The key to the distribu-
tion effect i  differential  impact on the poor vis-a-vis  the nonpoor  house-
holds.  Thu  , the  distribution  effect can be viewed both  at the  aggre-
gate and  h  usehold  levels.
Dwell  ng further  on the acquisition  effect, this paper expresses it
in  four  wa  ,namely:  I)  child  costs, 2) labor supply, 3) savings, or 4)
factor  rewa  dsJ  Child costs  refers to added  costs due to the presence of
an  extra  c  ildj  such as the  direct  or  opportunity  cost of  child  care.
Additional  ependents  in a household  may induce  greater  labor sup-
ply from  n  ndtpendents.  Fertility  may affect household  accumulation.
While  initi  lly the  effect  of an  additional  child  on household  labor210 PHXLIPPINEjOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT
sup  ly is indeterminate  due  to  the  opposing  negative  effect  via de-
man  s for  child  care and positive  effect due to induced  labor  supply,
over time  the child  enters the  labor force  and increase household  la-
bor  upply. This  may depress real wages for  the  poor who tend  to be
uns  illed  compared  to the rich-the  Malthusian  effect.
Finally,  what are the mechanisms  in the  conversion  channel? As
note  earlier,  this  channel  refers to whether  demographics  affect the
cap  ity to transform a given income  or consumption  expenditure  level
into  welfare  or capabilities  such as health  and schooling.  Necessarily,
this  ffect will primarily  have to be viewed at the household level. Again,
like  he  distribution  effect,  this  is also dependent  on differential  be-
havi  r between the poor and the  non poor households. The key issues
her  include:  1) whether  a large  family  is a rational  choice  for  the
poo  ; 2) if the economies of scale in consumption  are more  important
tha  sibling  crowding;  3) if  children  in large households  enjoy worse
edu  ation  and  health  care prospects;  4)  whether  getting  out  of pov-
erty becomes easier or more  difficult  by extra births.
Three  more  concerns have to be mentioned  on the  relationship
be  een population  and poverty. These are differential  demographic
tran  ition,  mutual  causation, and  intergenerational  transmission.  Dif
fer;  tial demograPhic  transition refers to the observed regularity  that the
poo  usually experience  declining  mortality  and  subsequently falling
fert.lity  later, and with a longer  lag between them,  than the nonpoor.
Thi  has significant  implications  on the  distribution  and  conversion
effe  ts.  Mutual  causation refers  to  the  fact  that  rapid  population
gro  th-early  first  births,  large  families,  high  child-adult  ratios  and
clos  r spacing of  siblings-may  not  only be a cause but also a conse-
que  ce of poverty due largely to constraints  on and even the  rational
beh  vior of the poor. This has troubled  empirical  tests on the relation-
shi  between  demographic  changes  and  poverty.  Finally,
inte  generational  transmission of poverty and inequality has been cited
as a very important  welfare  issue. Lam  (1987),  for  instance, is not  as
stro  g on the  other  of  aspects of  the  impact  of  demography  on in-
equ  lity but identified  this issue as very important.  His basis is the well-
acc  pted  negative  impact  of  high  fertility  on child  endowments  (in-
clu  ing  human  capital).  Incidentally,  this  has also been identifies  as
the basis for  the  intergenerational  vicious  cycle of  poverty  argument
trig  ered by high  fertility  rates among the poor.ORBETA 211
Review 0  empirical  evidence
Growth  efj ects
The relati  nship between population  change and the level and growth
in per ca  ita income has been the subject of scrutiny and a long-drawn
debate. T  e assessment  in the 1980s qualified  the strong negative im-
pact verd  ct in the  1970s. For instance, a more  calculated  assessment
exemplifi  d  by the  statement  from  the  National  Research Coun<;il
(1986)  s  tes that  "on  balance, we  reach the  qualitative  conclusion
that slow  population  growth would  be beneficial  to economic  devel-
opment  £ r most developing  countries."  More  recent empirical  results
utilizing  c  nvergence-pattern  or technology  gap models such as Kelly
and  Sch  idt  (1995, 2001), however, yielded  large negative impact  of
populatio  change  on  growth  of  per capita  income.  In  particular,  a
study by  elley and Schmidt  (1995), using data covering a 30-year pe-
riod  (196  1990), finds that a unit decline from recorded  median popu-
lation  gro  th rate of 2.54 to  1.54 percent results in an increase of per
capita GN  growth from  its median of 1.36 to 2.00 percent.  High crude
birth  rate  were found  to reduce economic  growth while  decreases in
crude  dea h rates increase economic  growth.  A survey and re-estima-
tion  of  ei  ht  models  incorporating  several economic-demographic
approach  s given  in  Kelly and  Schmidt  (2001) validates  this  earlier
result.  Th  survey highlights  the  following  results:  1) demographic
trends  (d  clining  population  growth, fertility,  mortality;  changing age
distributi  n;  and  rising  density  and  population  sizes) have sizeable
impact  0  economic  growth;  2) while  the  overall  impact  of popula-
tion  grow h is negative, fertility  and  mortality  effects have offsetting
effects wit  increases due to mortality  decline stimulating  growth while
increas  ue to rise in fertility  attenuating  growth;  3) increasing  den-
sities an  opulation  size contribute  a positive but relatively small boost
to econo  ic growth,  with scale effects dominating  density; 4) in most
models,  e impact  of demography  has declined  over time.
It is  orth  noting  that the role  of changing age structure  accom-
panying  d  mographic  change was found  to  have a considerable  ex-
planatory  ower to rapid  economic  growth  in East  Asia in the past two
decades.  hus,  it  is argued  that  population  neutralism  of the  1980s
maybe w  the offshoot  of the too  much focus on impact  of aggregate
populatio  growth  to the  neglect  of the  impact  of changes in the age
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of th  demographic  transition,  per capita income declines because of
large  outh  dependency  burden  and a small proportion  of working-
age a  ult  working  and saving. As the  transition  proceeds,  per capita
in co  e increases as the share is reversed with  relatively more workers
and  s verso  This  constitutes  a potential  window  of  opportunity,  now
popu  arly known as the "demographic  bonus," which will evaporate as
the s  are of the elderly rises in the later phase of the transition.  Simu-
latio  s done  by Lee et al.  (2001), using data from  Taiwan, validated
the  h pothesis of increases in savings rates as the proportion  of work-
ing a  e population  increases under  the  assumption of constant inter-
est ra e ~nd constant productivity  rate.  Bloom and Williamson  (1998)
find  a~ population  dynamics  explain  as much as 1.4 to 1.9 percent-
age  oillits  of the  GDP per capita  growth  in  East Asia, or as much  as
one-  ird  of the  average East Asian miracle  GDP per  capita  growth
rate  1.9(6.1).  In Southeast Asia, the estimated effect ranges from  0.9
to  1.  points  of  economic  growth  or  about  half  (1.8/3..8)  of  the  re-
cord  d g)rowth in GDP per capita. Finally, Eastwood and Lipton  (2001)
esti  te  that had the  average country5 reduced  its birth  rate  by five
per  t  ousand  throughout  the  1980s, the  average poverty  incidence
woul  have been declined  from  18.9 percent  in the mid-1980s to 12.6
perc  nt between 1990 and 1995. About  half  of this reduction  is attrib-
utabl  to increases in economic  growth.
irnulations  using  the  Population  and  Development  Planning
(PD  ) Model,  an economic-demographic  model estimated using Phil-
ippi  e data, also show that higher  population  growth lowers GNP per
capit  level (Orbeta  et al. ~999). Furthermore,  this negative effect was
foun  to be much  bigger if  foreign  capital inflows are held  fixed.
A l~ok at the growth performance  of countries  in Asia shows that
the  ilippines  had lagged behind  Thailand,  which had about the same
pop  lation  size and even lower per capita income  in 1965. Thailand's
pop  ladon is growing  at less than one percent while  that of the Philip-
pine  is ~till growing  at more  than 2 percent. As a result, after 35 years
the  hil~ppines has about  14 million  more people and about less than
half  fThailand's  per capita income.
As noted  earlier,  growth  in  per capita income  is also affected  by
phys cal:and human capital investments. At the macrolevel, it was  found~
"The  d~taset includes 45 less developed and transition countries.that incre  sed human  capital  expenditures  (aggregate expenditures
on educa  ion  and  health)  spawned by rapid  population  growth  are
insufficie  t to  maintain  per capita  levels, which  implies  negative im-
pact on e  ucation  and  health  output  (Orbeta 1992).
At t  e hpusehold  level, Herrin  (1993) finds  that accumulation  of
househol  assets  is negatively affected  by the  number  of young  chil-
dren  0 to  and 7 to 12 years old. This  result is corroborated  by Mason
(1992).  T  e study finds  that child  bearing  negatively affects the saving
rate. Alth  ugh it does not  affect the absolute am~unt  of savings, asset
per child  as found  to be greater  in lower fertility  households.
Distributi  effects
As has be  n mentioned  earlier,  there  has not been as much  work  on
this chan  el compared  to the growth effects. In an earlier review, Lam
(1987) no es that  empirical  evidence leads to mixed  conclusions.  Fur-
thermore  the  review emphasizes that the  "certainty  of negative distri-
butional  e fects of population  growth expressed in the 1974  World  Bank
report  on population  and development.  ..seems  to be a much stron-
ger  concl  sion  than  the  empirical  arid  theoretical  analysis of  the  is-
sues can c  rrently  support."
Utili  ins  newer modeling  ideas, recent results such as Eastwood
and  Lipt  n  (1999;  2001),  provide  more  definitive  conclusions.  The
study not  onlry found  that  high  fertility  retards  economic  growth  (as
noted  ab  ve)  but  also skews the  distribution  of income  against the
poor.  Th  ir  estimate  revealed  that  half  of the  estimated  decline  in
poverty c  uld  be attributed  to increases in economic  growth  and half
to  chang  s in  the  distribution  of  income.  The  results  further  high-
lighted  th  fact  that  as fertility  decline  spreads to  poor  households,
the  pover  -reducing  benefits  of  fertility  decline  increase even more.
Reinforci  g this  result are similar  findings  in Brazil,  a country  that is
in the  lat  r stages of fertility  transition  (Paes de Barros  et al. 2001).
Dependen  effects
In  trying  0 find  evidence  of  the  dependency  effect,  Eastwood and
Lipton  (1  99) used  18 of the  56 World  Bank Poverty Assessments  on
dependen  y ratios  for  the  poor  and  nonpoor.  The  data  show only a
slight  dep  ndency  effect as the dilution  ratio  of the poor was found  to
be only sl.  htly  higher  than those for the nonpoor.2141
Acqui  'tion effects
In ter  s Qf acquisition  effect, studies on the impact  of additional  chil-
dren  n ~me  allocation  show that  the  mother's  labor  market  hours
decli  e  14 months  after  giving  birth,  after  which  they  return  to  the
pre  us level; the father's  labor  market  hours  are  not  affected,  nei-
the  oes the  loss of  the  labor  market  hours  of the  mother  induce
more  abor market hours  for  the father;  the labor  market  time  of the
older  aughter, however, increased (Tiefenthaler  1997). It appears that
the 01  er' daughter  replaces the  lost market time  of the  mother.  Ear-
lier  st  dies  both  support  and  negate  results of  this  finding.  For in-
stanc  , Quizon-King  (1978) finds  that the  labor  market  time  of both
moth  r and  father  is not  affected  and  only the  mother's  home  time
incre  ses. This  is largely  corroborated  in King  and  Evenson (1983).
Garci  (1990),  on the  other  hand, finds  that  having  young  children
decre  es the market time  of the mother  but increases the market time
of  the father.
n the labor force  participation  of older  children,  a joint  school-
ing-la  or!force  participation  model for  children  10 to 24 years old was
estim  ted  using  a merged  Family  Income  and  Expenditure  Survey
(FIES  , Labor Force Survey (LFS) and Functional  Literacy  Education
and  ass  Media Survey (FLEMMS)  for  1994 in Orbeta  (2000). He finds
that £ mily size does not significantly  affect school attendance  but posi-
tively  afft:cts  labor  force  participation.  Corroborating  this  result,
Villa  il  (f2002), using the  1995 Child  Labor Survey, provides evidence
that  t  e probability  of children  5 to  14 years old  not  going  to  school
but w  rking  is positively related  to the number  of young  children  (0-9
years) but is negatively related  to the number  of older  children  (15-17
years) in the family.
n the aspect of the impact of rapid  population  growth  on wages,
Bloo  and Freeman  (1988) find  that for the period  1965-1985, devel-
oping  countries  were able to shift the  labor force  from  low productiv-
ity ag iculture  to higher  productivity  industry  and services sectors de-
spite  he rapid  growth  of their  population.  This shows that there  may
not b  much depressing  impact  on wages. They caution,  however, that
such  djustments  may become  increasingly  difficult  in the future.  In
the  c  se of the  Philippines,  studies  (e.g., de Dios et. al.  1993) reveal
slow  rowth  in  employment  opportunities.  This  is further  buttressed
by th  high  open unemployment  and underemployment  rate that did
not  s  are even educated  workers  (Orbeta  and Pernia  1999).  Finally,
the  c  ntinued  flow  of  overseas contract  workers  is  testimony  to  theORBETA 215
lack of  e~ PIOyment opportunities  domestically.  All  of  these indicate
that  the  althusian  negative  impact  of rapid  population  growth  on
poverty vi  the  distribution  effect may be operating.
Conversion  efftcts
While  pri  arily the evidence  on conversion  effects would  come from
household  le~l  analysis,  there are indications  that can be gleaned from
the aggre  ate!  level. For instance, there are countries  where per capita
incomes  0  p~r capita  consumption  are lower  but  indicators  of well-
being  are  be1Jter  than  those  with  higher  incomes.  Sri Lanka,  for  in-
stance, ha  lower  per capital income  than  Indonesia,  the Philippines,
and Thail  nd  (Table  6), but  it has better  infant  mortality  record  and
school att  ndance,  particularly  at the secondary level. We now turn  to
the house  old-level evidences.
Fertility pr;  erences
An empiri  al regularity  one finds worldwide  is that poverty incidence
is always h gh~r among households  with  larger family size. The Philip-
pines  is n  e~ception,  as shown in Table  7, The  question  is whether
the  poor  ati«)nally choose to  have large  families,  There  are indeed
conceptua  reasons and  even empirical  evidence  that  the  poor  may
prefer  to  ave large  families, These could  be any or a combination  of
the follow'ng:  they put  high value on the perceived benefits  of having
many chil  ren;  they put low value on the costs of having them;  or they
find  small  rQbability  in  enjoying  the  alternatives,
Amo  g the commonly  cited reasons are that children  add to fam-
ily  incom  , provide  old-age security,  and  that  fewer and  better-edu-
cated chil  ren with  better earning  prospects  may be just a remote'op-
tion  for  th  poor, The  reasons could  include  requiring  what to  them
could  be  naffordable  savings, delayed  (or  heavily  discounted)  and
risky retur  s, ~nd  very high  opportunity  cost from  foregone  child  la-
borincom,
How  ver, Birdsall  et aI, (2001) challenge  the belief  that the poor
rationally  hopse to have large families  and require  proofs  on the fol-
lowing  wh ch,! which  have been highlighted  by recent studies: 1) that
the choice  off  the  poor  are not limited;  2) that the  poor  have the re-
quired  inp  ts to make an informed  choice;  3) that  men do not domi-
nate the  c  oice  over the  number  of  children  while  not  fully  sharing
the costs; (d)  that there is no higher  prevalence  of unwanted pregnan-
cies amon  the  poor  compared  to  the  nonpoor;  and  5)  that  fertility216 fHILIPPINE  JOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT
has i  creased among  the  very poor  who  have good  access to  health
and £:  mily planning  information  and services. It would  require  inten-
sive t  sts  to know the answers to these questions. However, the answers
may  e g~eaned from  available data on the Philippines.
able 8 shows the  differential  contraceptive  practice  of the poor
and  t  e monpoor.  It  must be noted  that the  classification,  due to data
limi  tions,  may be a bit loose. But if contraceptive  practice  is an indi-
catio  Ofi  the  extent  of control  over fertility,  the table shows that, from
eithe  thie actual contraceptive  practice  or access to  family  planning
servi  es, ,the  poor  may have less control  over  their  fertility  than  the
nonp  or, Using  a finer  disaggregation  of  households,  Table 9 shows
that  he  disparity  in  the  use of  modern  contraceptives  by poor  and
nonp  011  households  is even more  pronounced.  If  access  and contra-
cepti  e practice  were  even for  both  the  poor  and the  nonpoor,  then
the p  or, as shown in Table 6, could  have large  family  size by choice.
Final y, tpe evidence  on unwanted  fertility  and unmet  need for  family
plan  ing points  to  the  disparity between the  poor  and the nonpoor.
Pam  111  and  Ramosjimenez  (2000), using the  1993 National  Demo-
grap  ic  Survey  (NDS),  the  1998 National  Demographic  and  Health
Surv  y (NDHS)  and a wealth index,  show that women  in the  poorest
20 pe  ce~t of households are 27 percent more  likely to have unwanted
fertil  ty and  122 to  154 percent  more  likely  to have un met need6 for
famil  pl!inning  compared to women in the richest 20 percent of house-
hold  .T~ble  10 shows a similar  story using data from  the  recent  2002
roun  of the Family Planning  Survey.  The table shows that women from
the p  orest households have almost twice as much prevalence of unmet
need for  family  planning  as do women from  the  richest households.
Econ mitis of  scale  in consumption
On t  e aspect of economies of scale in consumption,  evidence on both
sides of the  argument  exists. It has been  shown that the negative im-
pact  n  consumption  of  large  family  size will  not  hold  under  some
plaus'bl~  assumptions  about economies of scale in  consumption  (e.g.
Lanj  w ctnd Ravallion  1995 for Pakistan; Anand  and Morduch  1996 for
Bang ad~sh). But there  are also pieces of evidence  on the  congestion
effec  .King  (1987),  for  instance, notes crowding  in the poor's  small
dwel ings.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10. Unmet need for  family planning  by asset class, 2002
A~t  Class Poor/Rich
Ratio
_I~orest 
L.  Middle-MidC!I~~.iddle  Richest Total
Total 26.9 22.2 17.2 18.0 15.6 20.0 1.7
Spacing 13.6 10.8 7.9 9.6 8.7 10.1 1.6
Limiting 13.4 11.4 9.3 8.3 6.9 9.9 1.9
Source:  Autjr'S calculation
Basic  data:  PS 2002. Methodology  used to compute  the asset classes  is described  in Orbeta  et
al.  2003.
Investmen  s in human caPital
Empirica  evidence  that high  fertility  is associated with  decreasing in-
vestmen  in  education  and  health  abounds.  King  (1987) provides  a
review  0  studies  on  the  effect  of  population  change  on household
welfare.  he conclusions  include  the  followmg:  1) children  in large
families  erform  worse in school;  2)  children  in large  families  have
poorer  haIth,  lower  survival  probabilities,  are less developed  physi-
cally;  3) i  pact on parental  welfare is not as clear. These conclusions
are subst  ntially  echoed  in a more  recent  review of studies with some
added  di  ensions  (Lloyd  1994).  In  particular,  the  study found  that
the adver e impact on children  born into  large families can be grouped
into:  1) r  source  dilution,  with  each child  getting  a smaller share of
family  re ources, including  income,  time, and  maternal  nutrition;  2)
the "opp  rtunity  effect"  through  diminished  access  to public  resources,
such as h  alth care and education;  3) the "equity effect,"  which means
unequal  distribution  of  resources  among  siblings;  and  4)  the
"intergen  rational  effect,"  with  the adherence  to the  traditional  role
affecting  e transmission  of opportunities  to the  next generation.
Orb  ta  (2002)  reviews several more  studies showing  similar  re-
sults in th  Philippines.  High  fertility  does not affect school participa-
tion  of yo  nger children  (7-12 years old)  but negatively affects school
participa  on and attainment  of older  13-17  years old children  (Herrin
et al. 199  ). Bauer and Racelis (1991) corroborate  this result on older
children.  eGraff  et al. (1993) particularly  emphasized the large nega-
tive impa  t on boys. In addition,  it affects not only the school comple-220  I  P~ILIPPINEJOURNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT
tion  r~tes of  children  but  also the  expenditure  per  child  (Bankosta
and E~en$on 1978).
Vulner bil,ty
Finall  , there  is growing  evidence that larger  family size makes it diffi-
cult  f, r  poor  families  to  get  out  of  poverty  and  for  the  currently
nonp  or ~o  be more prone to slide below the poverty threshold.  Glewwe
and  H  II !(1998), for  instance,  using  panel data  from  Peru, find  that
famili  s that  have more  children  are more  vulnerable  to  macroeco-
nomic  sh~cks. Vulnerability  is defined  as changes in the  one's socio-
econo  ic status, Using the  1997 FIES, and the 1998 and 1999 Annual
Pover  Indicator  Survey  (APIS),  Reyes (200'2) shows very revealing
pover  dynamics. Tracing the movement of families  in and out of pov-
erty 0  er this  three-year period,  she finds  that  46 percent  of the fami-
lies  ar  not  affected  and  remain  nonpoor  throughout  while  22 per-
cent r  main poor.  Table  32 in  her  paper is quite  revealing.  It  clearly
shows thalt as one goes from  being  poor  to being  nonpoor,  the family
size d  clipes.  It  clearly  implies  that  getting  out  of  poverty  becomes
harde  wi,th larger  family  size.
Impli  ations  for  policy
Sever I themes can be gleaned from the foregoing  discussions to guide
policy  namely:
ne, while  it would  be wrong to attribute  solely to  high  fertility
the hi  h incidence  of poverty in the country,  recent  research provides
even s ronger  evidence showing the important  roles that demographic
chang  s play in development  in general, and poverty alleviation  in par-
ticula  .At  the  aggregate  level, it retards  the  growth  in  per  capita in-
come  it lowers savings rates and investments  in physical and human
capita.  An  even more  overwhelming  evidence  of the  depressing  im-
pact 0  high  fertility,  particularly  on savings and human  capital invest-
ments  e~ists at the household  level. The  impact  through  the distribu-
tion  c  aQnel has also been found  to be  equally  potent  by recent  re-
searc  ,showing  that  it  skews the  distribution  of income  against the
poor.  inally,  household  level studies continue  to  reveal the deleteri-
ous e  ect of  high  fertility  on the  attainment  of wellbeing  of the  poor
given  their  incomes.  These  results should  further  strengthen  the  re-
solve  f concerned  sectors like  the  government  to include,  as part  of
the p  verty alleviation  package, programs  to improve  fertility  manage-
ment  f poor  couples.ORBETA 221
Tw  , while  it has been argued  that  the  observed pattern  of the
poor ba  ing a larger  family size is the  result of their  rational  choice, a
closer I  ok at the data reveals that this can only be partially  true in the
case of t  e Philippines.  National  survey data reveals that while wanted
fertility  th,e closest indicator  of fertility  preferences-of  women from
poorer  ouseholds  is  higher  compared  to  those  from  richer  house-
holds,  it alsp shows that the  poor  also have higher  unwanted  fertility.
The  hig  er unwanted  fertility  of  the  poor  is explained  by limited  ac-
cess  to f  mily  planning  and allied  services, lower contraceptive  preva-
lence ra  es, and  higher  un met need for  family  planning.  An effective
family  p anming program  is thus needed to improve  the poor's  control
over the  rfertility  and enable  them to realize  their  fertility  goals.
Th  ee, current  fertility  choices  not  only have contemporary  but
also int  generational  impact.  There  is overwhelming  evidence, even
during  t  e ,1980s, when  analysts doubted  the  importance  of  fertility
regulati  n in  development,  that  high  fertility  leads to  decreased in-
vestmen s in human  capital.  This  has been identified  as the  main  en-
gine  of i  tergenerational  transmission  of poverty.  It migh t too late to
wait  for  hei poor  to reduce  their  fertility  to solve this problem.  This
requires  prcl>active  subsidy and  better  targeting  of public  services to
improve  human  capital  investments  (e.g.,  education  and  health)  of
the poo  It lis worth  noting  that this has both  short and  long-term  ef-
fects.  In  the  short  term,  it shields the  poor  from  deprivation  due to
their  cu  rent  economic  status. Over the  long  term,  it helps  stop the
intergen  rational  transmission  of poverty.  These interventions  have
good so ioeconomic  returns  apart from  dealing  with the externalities
of fertili  decisions.
Fo  r,  it  has been  shown by  decomposition  analysis that  in  the
Philippi  es, growth  is the  primary  contributor  to the  decline  in pov-
erty  inci  ence while  crosscountry  analysis considers  the  lowering  in-
equality  s playing a secondary role. Sustained economic  growth should
therefor  remain  the  primary  strategy of development  in the immedi-
ate  term  with  lowering  inequality  as the  secondary strategy. On  the
role  of d  mographics,  even those who believe  in the important  role  it
plays in  evelopment  are quick to add that these are mostly potential
benefits.  more conducive economic  environment  is required  to trans-
late thes  into  reality. This is clearly demonstrated  by the difference  in
impact  0  similar  demographic  transitions  unfolding  in East Asian and
Latin  erican  countries.  In  East Asia, the  demographic  transition222 ~HILIPPINEJO\JRNAL  OF DEVELOPMENT
facilit  ted rapid economic growth. In Latin America, on the other hand,
a mo  modest economic  growth had been achieved.
ive, globalization  introduces  at least two elements  that have im-
porta  t implications,  as enumerated  by the  foregoing  discussions: 1)
it cre  tes opportunity,  and 2) it means rapid  changes in the economic
envir  nment.  At the aggregate economy level, to benefit  from  oppor-
tuniti  s created  by  globalization,  the  economy  must be able to  shift
resou ces to sectors where  demand  is expanding  from  sectors where
dema  d is contracting.  To the extent  that high  population  growth de-
ters i  vestments  in  both  physical and  human  capital,  it means it  can
hinde  these needed shifts. Similarly, at the household  level, those who
have  ewer  (and  by all indications  well  endowed)  children,  will  have
bette  chances of benefiting  from  globalization.  This  will  clearly con-
tribut  to worsening  inequality.  Finally,  recall  that increases in family
size i  creases the vulnerability  of households  to changes in economic
condi  ions as well as to slippage into  poverty. To the  extent  that glo-
baliza  ion implies  more  rapid  changes in the economic  environment,
this  eans increasing  vulnerability  for those who have large families.
ix,  all of the foregoing  point  to the important  role demographic
chang  s play in development in general, and poverty in particular.  They
provi  e more  than enough justification  for government to help couples
achie  e their  desired  fertility  and promote  small family size.ORBETA 223
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